Abstract. Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for unconditionally secure authentication of long messages. However Gehrmann showed that the proof of the security of the protocol was incorrect. Here we generalize the multiround protocol model. We prove the security of a 3-round protocol and give for this case a new easy implementable construction which has a key size close to the fundamental lower bound for even extremely long messages. Furthermore, we give a proof of a secure multiround protocol for an arbitrary number of rounds.
Introduction
Gemmell and Naor [ 13 proposed an unconditionally secure authentication scheme (or A-code) without secrecy in which, by following a protocol, codewords are passed back and forth. This scheme makes it possible, albeit at the expense of increasing data exchange, to authenticate very large messages while keeping the key size small. It was shown by Johansson, Kabatanskii and Smeets in [2] that for single round authentication the key size is bounded by t>he logarithm of the message size.
Denote by 1 0 g (~) ( z ) a Ic-times logarithm log(log( ... log(.))). Gemmell and Naor showed that their Ic-round protocol for a message size of TI bits demands a key size ( 
1) 1
ps H ( K ) x log(")(n) + 2log(-), where P, is the probability of a successful substitution attack for the scheme.
However, the security analysis made by Gemmell and Naor only took into account a certain substitution attack. In [3] Gehrmann, by considering the impersonation attack, showed that protocols where the number of rounds is even are of no interest. Furthermore, he introduced a special six step substitution attack for which tbc probability calculation of P8 madc by Gcmmell and Naor did not hold. In this paper, we push the analysis further. We propose new protocols and prove their security.
In Section 2 we give a classification of possible attacks on multiround protocols. In the next section we propose a new %round protocol and also give a specific construction based on Reed-Solomon codes. Using the tools of Section 2 we give a proof of its security. In Section 4 we show how to make a secure protocol for a n arbitrary number of rounds. 
Attacks on multiround protocols
We will consider a system for message authentication in which a transmitter A wants to send a message to a receiver B by exchanging codewords. The transmission channel is supposed to be controlled by an opponent 0, who can send own (new) codewords over the channel to A and B or substitute codewords sent by A or B with own new ones. A and B are assumed to share secret information, Le., the key, unknown to the opponent. We denote by k the total number of codewords sent over the channel to authenticate the original message. Since the original message is sent by A we will denote this message by m A . The corresponding message observed by B may have been changed by the opponent and will be denoted by m B . The codewords used by the protocol in the authentication process we will denote by subindex. For example m i dcnotes the i-th exchanged codeword. A k = 3 round authentication protocol is shown in the figure below.
-- We will use the following notation:
-mA = m t , (mf), ..., mf-,: a by A sent and (received) codeword sequence. probability of a successful impersonation attack.
Ps :
probability of a successful substitution attack.
For the Gemmell and Naor milltiround protocol it was shown [3] that the last round should be omitted if k is even. This implies that in contrast with the Gemmell and Naor model it always have to be the receiver that detects the intruder. Hence, in our generalized multiround authentication model we will in the sequel assume k to be odd.
The attack described by Gehrmann follows an asynchronous model, which was the model used by Gemmell and Naor. The attacks we describe in this paper will also be in accordance with an asynchronous protocol model. To avoid meaningless complications we make the assumption that B(A) immediately after receiving an even(odd) codeword responds with his own odd(even) codeword, Le., we don't take into account the time delay for A and B. Depending on the secret key, not all sequences M are acceptable sequences. Denote by M(K) the subset of that are allowable sequences under the specific key I<'. Depending on the odd number received codeword, his own chosen even number codeword and the key K , A will create and observe a sequence mA E M ( K ) . In a similar way B, by receiving even numbered codewords and responding odd numbered codewords, will observe a sequence mB . He accepts the sequence as a message from A if and only if mB E M ( K ) . We will deal with two attack scenarios depending on the capabilities given to the opponent.
Ordinary substitution attacks
This case corresponds to the ordinary model for single round authentication [4], [5] , [6] . Here we assume that 0 has no capability to choose the message mA to be authenticated. This original message mA is for example in the Gemmell and Naor protocol equivalent with the first codeword m$ sent by A. All even numbered codewords observed by A and all odd numbered codewords observed by B are chosen by A and B respectively and hence the opponent 0 has only control over the codewords in the set 0 succeeds in a substitution attack if and only if he, during observation of the even codewords of mA and odd codewords of mB, creats a sequence of codewords from the set 0, such that the corresponding sequence observed by B
However as in the attack in [3], the order of the codewords substituted by the opponent could be chosen in an asynchronous way. Changing the order may increase P, and thus all possible order of substitution must be taken into account when calculating P,. Denote by t one particular substitution order (or type of attack) and by ~( t ) , m i ( t ) E 0 , the corresponding sequence of codewords created by 0 (0-sequence). Furthermore, denote by T,(k) the set of valid differently ordered substitution sequences for a k-round protocol and by ITs(k)l the cardinality of this set. We illustrate the notation with the following example. We have the following theorem on the number of different ordered 0-sequences.
Proof. The subsequences r n f , mf , ... and mf , m t , ... in rn(t) have t o be ordered.
There are 9 codewords in the A-subsequence, these should be chosen out of k differents positions in the 0-sequence. Hence tjhere are (A) different 0-sequences of length k .
a Using the introduced definitions P, may be written as
Chosen message substitution attacks
We will in the sequel deal with an attack model where the original message might freely be chosen by the opponent. T h i s includes that 0 has the capability to choose both the first original message mA and m B , the one to substitute it with. When the opponent is also given the additional possibility to freely choose the original message mA that should be authenticated, the situation looks different. The first codeword m t sent by A may consists of just mA or mA and a second part created by A. In the chosen-message substitution scenario we assume thal 0 may freely choose the part mA of m# and 0 thus has control over the set
where the ' marks that 0 maybe not might control me completely. Similar to the ordinary substitution attack case we denote by T,(k) the different ordered 0-sequences of length k + 1. We then have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2.
Proof, This case corresponds to that for Theorem k + 1 and an A-subsequence of length (k+l) .
1 with a 0-sequence of length Similar to the ordinary substitution attack case we denote one particular ordered sequence by ~( t ) .
Denote by Pi the probability of successful substitution attack for the chosen message scenario. Pi may be written as Adding the chosen-message attack t o the model increases the demands on the authentication protocol. A protocol that is secure in a model including the chosen-message attack is obviously also secure for the ordinary substitution attack model. We will from now on only consider protocol that are secure in the stronger chosen-message attack model sense. Change the demands on the protocols and only letting them be secure for the ordinary substitution attack might reduce the complexity.
Remark. In the single round authentication case there are different definitions of P, in use. To ensure secure single authentication when the chosen-message attack is added to the model it is necessary to use the maxmax definition of P, as for example made in [2], [7] .
Secure k = round protocols
We start with a special treatment for k = 3. We propose a protocol which is a modified version of that of Gemmell and Naor [l] .
Let Q be a power of a prime and denote by C a code over G F ( Q ) with length n. Let p > and the minimum distance d of the code C satisfy
Denote by C A an A-code for which the probability of a successful substitution attack is less or equal to p , and the probability of a successful impersonation (mf)) given CA(m;',Cmp(m~A) ). By the definition of the A-code the probability €or this event 5 p,. Hence the overall probability
Now using (5) gives the desired result,.
We will continue with giving an efficient construction by using Reed-Solomon codes (RS-codes).
Construction: For simplicity let
I -2' and let C be an RS-code over G F ( Q ) with k = 2", r -s = t. Hence [a] , i.e., pr = 2 -" , p 3 = 2"-*/2" = 2-'. Thus we have a construction which needs t random bits at the transmission side, T random bits at the receiver side and with a key size of 2v bits. Furthermore, the construction allows a message size:
Theorein4. F a r the construction abave P: < 21-t. The message size, key size and authenticator length for different parameters of the construction is list,ed in Table 1 below together with the concatenated RS-codes single authentication construction parameters of [7] . It follows from the table above that the 3-round authentication system realizes very long message authentication by using short keys and that the key size even for e x h m e l y long messages is close to the Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane [9] famous square root bound for single authentication, i.e., 210g( k).
The data expansion of the protocol is just ~2 " -~ + t bits for a protocol with a key size of 2v bits and with Pi < 21-t, and is hence almost negligible.
4 k > -5 round protocol
As we have shown in the previous section, the 3-round protocol gives a secure authentication system with very short keys and few random bits for most practical situations. However to make the treatment complete we now also prove the security of a multiround protocol for an arbitrary number of rounds. Consider the following protocol:
Let p be a security parameter and C' a code over GF (Q,) A k 2 5 secure protocol is described below. Theorem 5. For the protocol above
Proof. Among all T,(k) att,acks we will consider only two types; i) either we follow the order of the protocol, i.c., the sequencc
or ii) any of all the other types of attacks.
i) This case corresponds t o t h a t analyzed in [l] with adding the j's to the protocol. However the j ' s are not affecting the choice of indices and the proof still holds, giving the probability of successful attack less than ii) As in the proof of Theorem 3 if 0 sends the last codeword mF-l before receiving mfWi he succeeds with probability at most p . Thus assume mf-l is
Ihe last codeword in the attack scyuerice and that after the codeword I >_ 2, mf (or 1 2 3, m f ) the order of the protocol is followed. An arbitrary attack sequence not equal to tlhat of i) may then be described as 2"-1+ (1 --)(2(1 -F ) P ) < 2(1 -3 ) P
Conclusion
We have generalized the model of the Gernmell and Naor rnultiround protocol. A proof a secure 3-round protocol was given together with a very efficient construe.-tion for this protocol. The construction demands only a key size of 88 bits for a protocol which authenticate a message of size up to 2320 bits with probability of successful attack less than 2-39 and with a very small size of the data expansion. The 3-round protocol gives an unconditionally secure authentication system for most practical message sizes. Finally we have given a proof of a secure protocol for an arbitrary number of rounds.
